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ABSTRACT 
 
TAX CAPACITY IN POST-CONFLICT POLITIES 
 
 
Turan KELEŞ 
M.A. Thesis, July 2018 
Thesis Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Mehmet Emre Hatipoğlu 
 
Keywords: Conflict resolution, civil wars, state capacity, taxation capacity, bargaining 
theory 
What is the relationship between civil war, state capacity, and civil war termination? This 
paper examines the link between types of civil conflict settlements and taxation capacity 
by probing post-World War II civil wars. In this paper, we construct a bargaining theory 
of taxation and conduct relevant empirical analyses to capture the effect of the types of 
civil conflict settlements on taxation capacity recovery speed. Employing survival 
analysis, empirical results show that rebel victories and negotiated settlements increase 
the likelihood of tax capacity recovery rate. 
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ÖZET 
 
ÇATIŞMA SONRASI YÖNETİMLERDE VERGİ KAPASİTESİ 
 
Turan KELEŞ 
Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Temmuz 2018 
Tez danışmanı: Doç. Dr. Mehmet Emre Hatipoğlu 
 
Anahtar kelimeler: Çatışma çözümü, iç savaşlar, devlet kapasitesi, vergilendirme 
kapasitesi, pazarlık kuramı 
İç savaş, devlet kapasitesi ve iç savaşların son bulması arasındaki ilişki nedir? Bu çalışma 
İkinci Dünya savaşı sonrasındaki iç savaşları irdeleyerek iç savaşların son bulma biçimi 
ile vergi kapasitesini incelemektedir. Bu çalışmada, iç savaşların son bulma biçiminin 
vergilendirme kapasitesinin telafi hızı üzerindeki etkiyi bulmak için vergilemeye ilişkin 
bir pazarlık teorisi kuruyor ve uygun ampirik analizleri uyguluyoruz. Sağkalım analizi 
uygulandığında, ampirik sonuçlar isyancı zaferi ve müzakere yolu ile çözümlerin verginin 
telafi hızının olasılığını artırdığını gösteriyor. 
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CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
What is the relationship between civil war, state capacity, and civil war termination? 
Given the critical role these processes have played in the formation and development of 
the modern state and domestic politics for several centuries, scholars have generated 
substantial of theory and concomitant empirical tests (see e.g., Thies 2005, 2006; Tilly 
1975; Centeno 2002 Prichard 2010; Besley and Persson 2010) to better understand this 
phenomenon. There have been, indeed, numerous theoretical and empirical studies 
examining these concepts, yet they generally have not investigated these concepts 
mutually. Still, a few studies have rendered a theoretical framework that combines these 
three concepts. This study presents a causal link between civil war termination and state 
capacity and conducts systematic tests to gauge the validity of this causal link. 
An efficient tax system enables states to raise more taxes, which in turn help a state to 
conduct the state-society relationship through procurement of basic services such as 
security, health care and prosperity-oriented policies. The emergence of the modern state 
has been tightly linked to the formation of the tax system. Levi (1988) states that the 
history of state revenue is the history of the evolution of the state. The state building 
function of tax has two facets: on one hand, the state and society conduct a bargaining 
about the rate or amount of tax. On the other hand, in order to raise more taxes for 
government policies, states engage institution building (Brautigam 2008). The causal 
mechanism of state building underlies the fact that both facets of tax enhance the 
legitimacy of the state and establish a close relationship between the state and its 
constituents. Schumpeter argues that taxes not only created the state, but also formed it 
(Swedberg 1991: 108). State formation and the emergence of the parliamentary system 
date back to early European state formation to the interaction between state rulers and 
citizens over taxation bargaining. Facing the cost of war, European monarchs had to resort 
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to increasing taxes through a bargaining process with their citizens which, consequently, 
led to the development of a parliamentary system and more professional state apparatus. 
This, along with protection of property rights, rule of law and education for necessary 
bureaucrats, which are the fundamental elements of a modern state. 
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CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
2.1 General introduction to the concept of state capacity 
 
While discussing state capacity, we need to decompose the concept to capture a better 
notion. Firstly, by referring to the state, I mean the ability to maintain sovereignty over 
of certain geographical territory by monopolizing coercive power, legal authority, 
military instruments, and fiscal means. Secondly, capacity means that a state can exert 
desired policies on its constituents. I suppose in this paper that a state operates its function 
in line with a Weberian perspective that harbors a rational bureaucracy, openness, and    
accountability and hires administrative staff based on merit. 
A vast literature of political economy of taxation has focused on state-society relations, 
based on a bargaining process, with a particular link to state extractive capacity. This 
bargaining process generally came along with interstate or civil wars as an interaction 
between rulers and citizens to cover war costs in exchange for representation (see e.g., 
Acemoglu et al.  2001, 2006; Tilly 1975; Tilly and Tilly 1992; Schumpeter 1954; Mann 
1980; North 1990). State capacity, defined as the ability of a state to penetrate society to 
raise taxes and exert desired policies (Lu and Thies 2013), has commonly been 
investigated as a by-product of wars. Building upon state capacity literature, this study 
aims to enlarge our understanding of variations in contemporary state-building efforts by 
globally probing the effects of civil conflict resolution on state taxation capacity. What is 
the effect, if any, of conflict termination on state capacity? Do the types of conflict 
settlements have a substantial explanatory power in variations of overall tax intake? 
Jean Bodin, first, examined the linkage between state and extraction efforts in early 
European states, defines financial instruments as the nerves of the state (Braun 1975). 
Many theories of state capacity are based on the predatory theory approach, which is 
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derived from historical studies of early state formation in Europe. According to predatory 
theory, state rulers try to extract as much revenue as possible from their citizens for 
personal desires, or to implement the necessary policies (Levi 1988). The bellicist or 
predatory theory of state formation, in particular, has focused on the role wars played on 
European states’ providing public goods, consolidating institutions and increasing state 
extractive capacity. Facing the cost of war, European monarchs resorted to increasing 
taxes through a bargaining process with their citizens and, consequently, this led to the 
emergence of the parliamentary system and more professional state apparatus. Oft-cited, 
Tilly (1995) explains that state formation in Europe was intertwined with wars. Many 
other scholars also employ predatory theory to explain war as the chief catalyst for 
promoting the extractive capacity of states (e.g., Bean, 1973; Mann 1986; Tilly, 1975; 
Levi 1981; Downing 1993). In this vein, making war has even been considered a sine qua 
non for a strong state as a remedy for some malfunctioning state institutions. To that 
extent, Herbst’s (2000) provocative study in line with Jackson and Rosberg (1982) 
implies that the weakness of some African states is a result of the lack of external wars 
those countries encounter. Moreover, scholars attribute interstate war as playing a key 
role in bolstering efficient government institutions and acting as a a stimulus for a strong 
state (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Ferguson 2002; Tilly 1975, 1992), while other 
scholars accredit internal wars in places like East Africa and Southeast Asia as having 
this same kind of general positive effect on the state (Slater 2005; Weinstein 2005). 
On the other hand, a different path   from the experience of early European state formation 
took shape in other parts of the world. For example, in Korea under Japanese colonial 
rule, the rulers established a tax collection system based on forced military and forced 
labor service. Later, the Japanese built a formal tax collection system with state officials 
backed by police power (Kohli 2004). In this way, tax officials could penetrate into rural 
residential areas together with police and intelligence officers. Thanks to this kind of tax 
take system, the Korean government was able to collect a much higher tax ratio than other 
countries with similar levels of development (Shafer 1994). The Korean tax increase 
stands an example of securing sustained tax increases in the absence of war. What is 
missing in the literature of civil conflict is the impact of conflict settlement on state 
capacity. De Rouen and Sobek (2004) examine the effect of state capacity on conflict 
settlement and war duration, but do not examine the causality in reverse direction. In what 
follows, I bring both pieces of literature on civil conflict settlement and state capacity 
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together to analyze whether there is a significant relationship between conflict resolution 
and state capacity. I develop a set of hypotheses on the determination of the potential 
interaction between civil war conclusion and state capacity by exploring civil war data 
from Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). 
Tilly (1992) explains the state-making of a country in four steps. Firstly, states eliminate 
their external rivals. Secondly, they eliminate their internal rivals. Thirdly, they eliminate 
the threats against their citizens. Finally, they try to extract revenue from their citizens to 
cover the costs of these three steps. State capacity, in narrow terms, is the ability to exert 
state policies effectively within the society (Tilly 1990), a state’s ability to enforce a set 
of policies (Besley and Persson, 2009), and the ability of a state to efficiently govern its 
territory (Skocpol 1985). 
The extraction ability of a state depends on the bargaining power of rulers versus 
constituents in the face of a challenge that is aimed at the state survival over revenues. 
Interstate wars facilitate this bargaining power in favor of rulers (Cohen, Brown & 
Organski 1981; North 1981; Tilly 1985; Rasler & Thompson 1985), and the extent to 
which internal wars affect rulers’ bargaining power is not clear (Levi 1988; North 1981). 
Some studies empirically show that internal wars indeed reduce the rulers’ bargaining 
power and result in a decrease in revenue extraction (for Africa see Thies 2005, 2006, 
2007 and for the Middle East see Lu and Thies 2013). On one hand, some scholars argue 
that internal wars are detrimental (Desch 1996) to state capacity or do not have an effect 
at all, (Herbst 1990) while others argue that under certain circumstances, internal wars 
may produce positive contributions to state capacity by enhancing elite solidarity 
(Rodrigez-Franco 2016). If internal and external wars have a significant effect on state 
capacity, in line with this logic, termination of these wars might entail some effect on 
state capacity as well. 
One possible causal mechanism is that while dealing with internal conflicts, state rulers 
might go about alleviating the tax burden of belligerent groups as a part of a negotiation. 
This type of negotiation is expected to decrease the tax extraction ratio. Another causal 
mechanism is that the government may not penetrate, for the purpose of extraction, the 
region in which rebel groups actively operate. On the other hand, following what 
predatory theory expects, the state rulers might increase tax efforts to defeat the 
insurgents, which would be expected to thereafter increase tax extraction. Ultimately, the 
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outcome of these possible causal mechanisms will determine whether a significant change 
in taxation will occur. 
Because the European experience of state building is not a very common phenomenon in 
the developing world, scholars have shifted their focus towards interstate rivalry and 
internal rivalry as other explanatory variables for interstate war (e.g. Thies 2005, 2007; 
Diehl and Goertz 2000; Thompson 2001; Lu and Thies 2013). As a matter of fact, some 
scholars argue that the current international system is so different from what existed at 
the time of the European experience, that predatory theory has very little explanatory 
power in understanding the state extractive capacity in the contemporary developing 
world (e.g., Desch 1996; Lustick 1997). The conflicts that pop up in the developing world 
differ from their European counterparts to the extent that they do not target the very 
existence of the state but aim for a lesser issue (Herbst 1990). The scarcity of interstate 
war in the period after World War II led to state rulers not being afraid of an invasion by 
foreign powers; thus, state rulers did not have the motivation to focus on cementing the 
state and its institutions (Mueller 2004). 
The logic of predatory theory, at the very basic level, argues that the revenue extraction 
from society due to facing external rivals will outweigh the transaction costs of revenue 
collection and the costs of war. High revenue extraction will, in turn, enhance state 
capacity and consequently provide security to people against external attacks. The reason 
for this is straightforward; external wars stimulate a common interest among society, 
whereas internal wars lead to social cleavage, particularly when considering public good 
provisions. Moreover, internal wars likely cause division of resources that is constitutive 
to distortion of the tax base. To examine state capacity, scholars have mostly relied on 
predatory theory until now. This paper differs from predatory theory in examining state 
extractive capacity in an approach that examines the state taxation capacity through 
conflict settlement, enhancing state legitimacy, and extending state presence within 
borders. The predatory model, and subsequently generalized models of it, locate the state 
as the main actor of the state-building process through extractive efforts. Unlike  
predatory theory, this paper enlarges the pool of actors in order to encompass other actors 
who actively affect tax capacity through bargaining or coercive power. The lack of 
interstate war in the contemporary developing world (Rasler and Thompson 1999), 
contrary to early European state formation, forces us to include other actors in order to 
understand the crucial role they play in conflict settlement, and its impact on taxation 
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capacity, an area that has been unexploited from a scholarly perspective. Additionally, 
the definition of state capacity is not constrained to military size or bureaucratic 
effectiveness, but also encompasses political democracy, coherence and quality of 
institutions (e.g., DeRouen and Sobek 2004; Hendrix 2010). This amplified definition of 
state capacity entails another justification for inclusion of civil war outcome as an 
explanatory variable on state extractive capacity, mainly since the interaction between 
government and other factions of society have a modifier effect on political institutions. 
The main developments in the political, economic and societal structure in world history 
arising from internal turmoil thus are not a mere coincidence. The critical question is 
whether we can develop a model to examine taxation capacity, which would constitute 
an alternative to what Centeno (2002) describes the state-building process in Latin 
America to be as ‘blood and debt' or Tilly's (1992) ‘capitalized coercion' model. 
Accordingly, this paper includes the active role of the state in line with De Rouen and 
Sobek (2004). It contrasts with Collier and Hoeffler’s (1999) greed and grievance model 
that only focuses on the rebel side. Their model explains civil war as a consequence of a 
lack of political and social rights. This paper explores the link between types of conflict 
settlement, such as government victory, rebel victory, negotiated settlement and tax raises 
as indicators of state capacity. 
A vast literature has examined the link between state capacity and internal and external 
wars. As a part of the internal wars of countries, civil war settlement is also expected to 
contribute to state capacity. Despite its importance in the literature, no one has yet studied 
this important issue from either qualitative or quantitative methodology. In examining 
state capacity and civil war termination, De Rouen et. al. (2010) investigate how state 
capacity affect peace agreement provisions in a case study; however, they do not employ 
state capacity as I use in this paper. They do not use the tax extraction capabilities of a 
state as a proxy for state capacity. They employ Composite Index of National Capabilities 
(CINC) scores, an index of military expenditure, military personnel, energy consumption, 
iron, and steel production, urban population, and total population (Singer, Bremer and 
Stuckey 1972) to proxy state capacity instead. Another study by Doyle and Sambanis 
(2000) ignores the state extractive capability in the aftermath of civil war settlement. 
Their study does not inspect how peace agreements impact state capacity, a question of 
central inquiry in this paper. This paper is the first study that examines the possible 
relationship between conflict settlement and state capacity as measured through tax raises. 
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While this study is admittedly imperfect and further future studies are certainly needed, I 
believe that this paper helps to chart a productive path forward in understanding this link. 
 
2.2 General introduction to the concept of civil wars 
 
2.2.1 On the onset of civil wars 
The very core rationale of resorting to violence refers to a psychological reasoning 
mechanism (Gurr 1970; Davies 1962). According to Gurr, if an individual feels a 
discrepancy between what he deserves and what he actually gets, what Gurr called 
“relative deprivation”, he becomes furious, which constitutes the first step in violence 
initiation. Once this sense of dissatisfaction becomes expansive in society, along with 
other convenient opportunities, it manifests itself in a rebellion. Opposing the grievance 
approach, greed-based approaches to civil war outbreak argue that grievance motives 
should be accompanied by material gain incentives for a civil war onset (Collier and 
Hoeffler 1998). Indeed, Licbach (1990), in dividing rebel actors as rational and non-
rational, suggests that inequality would not engender conflict among rational actors. Thus, 
the cost-benefit analysis of a rational group of people may hinder civil war onset despite 
the existence of grievance. In a later study, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) empirically show 
that a greed-based approach possesses more explanatory power than the grievance driven 
model. DeRoun and Sobek (2004), however, suggest that the greed and grievance models 
of explaining civil war occurrence are not mutually exclusive, but refer to different 
motivations of war initiations. In effect, civil wars do not instantly break out following a 
series of material imbalances among social groups or amidst intense perceived 
deprivations. The critical driver at play here is the collective action problem impeding 
rebellion or revolution (Kuran 1989; Olson 1971). All these studies suggest that 
inequality, perceived deprivation, and religious and ethnic characteristics of a country do 
not necessitate a violent action per se, but rather, that it is a sophisticated combination of 
all these determinants increase the odds of civil war. The common point all these 
approaches neglect to address is the role of state prevention capability, and the potential 
role of insurgency on civil wars. Focusing merely on the rebel side and not taking the 
state’s determinative power into account leaves the equation of civil war incomplete. One 
such criticism comes from DeRouen and Sobek (2004), who say that these rebel-centric 
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approaches fail to include state capacity as a decisive factor accounting for civil war 
incidence. They find that state capacity, proxying with bureaucratic effectiveness, 
weakens rebellion activities. In this study, I also incorporate the state’s role as a 
compelling factor to comprehend and provide a more clear-cut picture of the etiology of 
civil war insurgency. Accordingly, this study treats the state as an active player in civil 
wars. A state can essentially face an insurgency with coercive power. Hence, 
confrontation a strong military will increase the opportunity cost of rebellion and, will 
reduce the odds of civil war onset. In addition to its coercive power, a high capacity state 
can provide adequate public policies to its unsatisfied citizens, therefore mollifying their 
resentment. Apparently, different aspects of state capacity are at work in various parts of 
the interaction between state and society. Put differently, state capacity should be taken 
into account for both policy concerns and theoretical inquiries of civil war, whether it is 
attributed to the grievance model or greed model. 
In this paper, I use the definition of civil war explained by Doyle and Sambanis (2000), 
that it has caused more than 1000 battle-related deaths, involved at least one group of 
rebels against a state, and broke out within a sovereign state boundary. An alternative 
definition of civil war is that of the Correlates of War (CoW) (Sarkees 2000). The main 
difference between these two definitions is that while CoW requires 1000 battle-related 
deaths for every year, Doyle and Sambanis (2000) find an overall threshold of 1000 deaths 
sufficient. Secondly, Doyle and Sambanis (2000) consider the relapse of a civil war after 
two years to be a new conflict. 
In the aftermath of World War II, there was a significant decline in interstate wars, and a 
substantial increase in the numbers of civil conflict (Harbom et.al, 2006; Hegre et.al., 
2001). The ubiquitous nature of civil conflict since post-WWII has driven a good deal of 
academic research into the determinants of civil wars and how civil conflicts are to be 
resolved (see e.g., Licklider 1995; Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Hegre and Nygard 2014; 
Kruetz 2010). 
The onset and duration of civil wars are essentially ascribed to ‘greed vs grievance’, the 
model that explain civil wars based on political, economic, ethnic, and sociological 
grievances (Collier & Hoeffler 1999; Collier & Hoeffler 2002; de Soysa 2002). Collier 
and Hoeffler (1998) argue that the rebels will initiate a war if they reckon that the utility 
they gain will exceed their costs at the end of the war. They found that per capita income 
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is negatively, and the size of the population is positively related to civil war onset. In a 
further study, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) found that primary commodity export, the 
existence of a diaspora, dispersed population, and mountainous terrain are all significant 
determinants of civil war onset. They also argue that the grievance model, consisting of 
political rights, ethnic fractionalization, inequality, and religious fractionalization, have 
less explanatory power than the opportunity and greed model. However, Ross (2004) 
found no substantial link between primary commodity exports and civil war onset, 
arguing instead that oil dependency increases the likelihood of civil war onset. Hegre and 
Sambanis (2006) found that institutional instability, incomplete democracy, and 
undemocratic neighborhoods are highly significant and increase the risk of civil war 
onset. Fearon and Laitin (2003) drove attention to the conditions that favor guerilla 
warfare and insurgency such as a weak state, large population and political instability as 
catalysts for civil war outbreak. The empirical investigations on the onset of civil war 
indicate different reasons. Collier and Hoeffler (2002) argue that material opportunity 
motivations by rebels are more illuminative than political and social deprivations. 
The dependency of a group on economic endowments plays a critical role in forming 
rebel groups, their success, attracting recruits, and effective struggle against the 
government (Collier et al. 2003). Countries possessing high levels of lootable resources 
are more likely to experience civil war onset along ethnic lines (Lujala, Gleditsch, and 
Gilmore 2005). However, not all rebel groups emerge in economically well-off or 
lootable environments. This is partly because the structure and recruitment processes of 
different rebel organizations vary based on their ultimate aim. For instance, Sambanis 
(2001) argues that ethnic and nonethnic wars differ from each other because ethnic rebels 
make decisions related to ethnic affiliations, not earthly payoffs. In conflict areas that lack 
economic endowments, rebel leaders delve for means to form sound organizations and 
attract recruits such as using ethnic solidarity and ideological sentiments (Fearon and 
Laitin 2000; Sambanis 2001). The presence of economic endowments and identity-driven 
motivations do not guarentee an immediate formation of a rebel group. A substantial 
portion of people might still be reluctant to join the insurgency movement. One of the 
most difficult aspects of rebellion for rebel leaders to circumvent is the collective action 
problem, that is to convince a sufficient number of individuals to work together for a 
potential success (Olson 1965). One potential remedy for the collective action problem is 
to provide selective incentives (Popkin 1980; Lichbach 1994; Olson 1965), that is an 
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additional benefit of taking part in the rebel organization. Providing selective incentives, 
to a great extent, is contingent upon the capacity of rebel leaders. The assumption 
employed here regarding recruitment, in line with my research question, is that rebel 
leaders seek to recruit individuals for the purpose of capturing and controlling the state. 
Otherwise, due to adverse selection, a group of bandits or robbers could be recruited 
(Mueller 2000). Therefore, a strategic interaction process is required to deter any 
undesirable consequences of recruitment such as enrollment of low committed 
individuals. Weinstein (2005) develops a theoretical framework on how rebel groups opt 
for individuals in the presence or absence of economic endowments and asymmetric 
information, adverse selection and low commitment individuals. He concludes that 
ideological rebel groups attract more committed rebels compared to materially rich rebel 
groups. 
In any cases of different factors that increase the probability of civil war, three questions 
are crucial: Given a state’s almost universal preference to prevent civil war onset, why 
does it occasionally fail? Why can states not prevent a civil war in the first place? How is 
it related to state coercion or accommodative power? The answer to these questions seems 
to be related to states’ power and strategy to defeat insurgency. Societies with inefficient 
government institutions and few checks and balances, and which consequently are likely 
inept in enforcing contracts, and therefore, more likely to experience civil wars (e.g., 
Fearon and Laitin 2003; Eliana La Ferrara and Robert H. Bates 2001; Skaperdas 2008). 
The pervasive nature of civil conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa is, to some extent, explained 
through this incapability of state institutions. (Bates 2001, 2008; Jeffrey Herbst 2000). 
Some scholars see success in the development of some East Asian countries becoming 
strong fiscal states (Wade 2004 and Kang 2000). On the other hand, some scholars point 
to Africa wherein some countries remain weak due to the local elites' opposition to fiscal 
control by the national government (Migdal1988; Herbst 2000; Bates 2001). These 
scholars argue that this resistance ultimately hinders any reforms or controls the states 
might implement, thereby crippling the levels of public investments, as well as any hope 
for the state to grow stronger. Further, Galor et al. (2009) argue that the concentration of 
land in the hands of non-state elites leads to lower taxes, which cause underinvestment in 
education. As a result, certain components of state capacity seem to play an important 
role in handling civil wars, thereby leading to strong states. 
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2.2.2 On the duration of civil wars 
Once a civil war breaks out, the time interval to completion may depend upon the ultimate 
aim and decisions of the leaders of both warring parties. The aim of a rebel group might 
not be an outright decisive victory; rather it could force the government to engage in 
negotiations (Mason & Fett 1996; Mason, Weingarten & Fett 1999). Thus, the rebels 
might prefer a long-term horizon at the beginning of the conflict. Collier (1999) and 
Collier and Hoeffler (1999) argue that rebels try to prolong the fight as long as they find 
financial backing, and forest and mountain cover. Other structural factors such as lootable 
resources, forest, and mountain cover, and number of borders would contribute to the 
length of war by providing survival opportunities to rebels (e.g., Buhaug, Gates & Lujala 
2002; Collier 1999). Moreover, as long as the disagreements stemming from grievance 
(Collier and Hoeffler 1999) are extant, the rebels will recruit zealous volunteers to join 
the movement which, consequently leads to prolonging the time horizon of the civil war. 
From the state-centric perspective, a strong and big army can quickly suppress a rebellion 
before it achieves a profound level of organization. A state with potent bureaucratic 
means could closely monitor rebellious areas, accordingly patrolling to detect 
counterattacks beforehand and accommodate citizens with policies that cause them less 
bellicose (Fearon and Laitin 2003). In any case, the interaction between the state and 
rebels seem to determine the duration of civil war. To that end, a testable prediction is 
that state capacity, measured by military strength and bureaucratic effectiveness, should 
shorten the duration of civil war. On the duration of civil war, Collier et. al., (2004) state 
that the duration increases based on low capita income, higher levels of inequality and 
ethnic division, while a decline in the price of primary commodity exports and external 
military intervention are key factors that shorten the duration of civil war. DeRouen and 
Sobek (2004) argue that UN intervention lengthens the time span for a victory and 
shortens the duration of a negotiated settlement. Caverly and Sechser (2017) find that the 
capabilities of the government army and military technology decrease the duration of civil 
wars. Cunningham (2006) argues that civil wars that include more veto players, those 
who approve a settlement, tend to last longer. 
Collier (1999) and Collier & Hoeffler (1999) argue that rebel leaders start a civil war and 
try to retain it as long as they can find a war befitting environment such as mountain 
terrain, forests, and sufficient financial resources. In this vein, insurgency organizations 
might not aim for a quick victory but rather to survive for a long-time span, eventually 
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forcing the government to make concessions. Therefore, the duration of a civil war is, 
among other factors, a function of the aim of the rebel organization in the first place. 
Similar factors such as mountain terrain, lootable resources, number of bordering states, 
and the level of forest areas are also found to be associated with the ability of rebels to 
lengthen the duration of the civil war (Buhaug, Gates & Lujala 2002; Collier 1999). 
However, Snyder (2006) critiques the greed and grievance model, arguing that it does not 
take into account state capacity and the role that the state can play to prevent insurgency. 
DeRouen and Sobek (2004) fill this gap by probing the effect of state capacity on civil 
war outbreak and duration. The state's role in conflicts primarily consists of military and 
bureaucracy. They find that a strong state bureaucracy impairs rebels while a strong 
government army does not underpin government victory. 
 
2.2.3 On the termination of civil wars 
Civil conflicts are more likely to be resolved once the war reaches a point of “mutually 
hurting stalemate” in which adversaries think that they cannot defeat the other side 
(Zartman 2001). Civil conflicts tend to terminate in several ways - government victory, 
rebel victory, negotiated settlement and truce (Modelski 1964; Pillar 1983; and Stedman 
1991; Licklider 1995). Civil war studies generally have not studied the impact of different 
types of civil war outcomes on state capacity. However, keeping some empirical results 
linking the would-be post-conflict environment to government and rebel interaction in 
mind (e.g., Licklider 1995; Derouen and Sobek 2004; Walter 2004; Doyle and Sambanis 
2000), one should take all forms of civil war outcomes into account, for a better 
understanding of post-conflict taxation. There are various mechanisms that affect taxation 
with respect to civil war outcome. For example, Thies and Sobek (2015) find that civil 
wars that terminate with government victory are likely to increase state capacity, whereas 
a rebel victory requires more time to end up with an increase in taxation. In the extant 
literature, there is still no evidence of how negotiation settlement1 and truce affect state 
capacity. Adding the effect of negotiated settlement and truce to the analysis of state 
capacity, thus, will complete the picture of the relationship between civil war outcome 
and state capacity. Our understanding of civil war outcome and state capacity will be 
                                                          
1 Negotiated settlement and peace will be used interchangeably throughout this paper. Peace will be used in empirical 
analysis for convenience 
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improved to a greater extent since a more formal, binding and explicit bargaining process 
will take place between warring sides. State rulers and rebel leaders, indeed, may have 
particular aims regarding the outcome of a war (Mason, Weingarten and Fett 1999). In 
fact, the rebels and state rulers might construct their fighting strategy in line with that 
ultimate aim in their mind. Eventually, the relationship between post-conflict era relations 
and civil war termination has a bearing on how government policies and structural 
reforms will be shaped. Even though civil war outbreak was on the rise after the 1950s, 
substantial numbers of civil war ended after the 1990s (Hegre 2004). Civil conflicts have 
a lower chance of ending with bargaining, compared to interstate wars. A first glance at 
the termination of civil wars reveal that military victory outnumbers negotiated settlement 
or truce. This is because high stakes such as territorial division, resource sharing, and 
control of government are difficult to compromise (Licklider 1995; Bell 1972; Ikle 1971; 
Modelski 1964; Pillar 1983; Zartman 1993). Empirical studies evince this fact (e.g., 
Mason, Weingarten and Jett 1999; DeRouen and Sobek 2004). In settling civil wars, 
compromise seems particularly arduous because it involves many fickle factors, such as 
commitment problems, reneging on issues, and critical survival for either side (Bell 1972; 
Ikle 1971; Modelski 1964; Pillar 1983; Zartman 1993). Indeed, evidence indicates that 
only a small portion of civil wars ended with negotiated settlement (Pillar 1993). Armed 
civil conflicts are inherently high costly, and subject to uncertainty regarding how they 
will end because too many factors frame the type of their settlement patterns. Assuming 
that belligerent groups act rationally, it is expected that both sides will prefer a negotiated 
finale to a catastrophic end. As a matter of fact, not all conflicts wrap up by using violent 
means. Acemoglu and Robinson (2001, 2006) argue that while elites and poor contest 
over state control, elites extended suffrage to accommodate the poor that can pose a threat 
to the rebels. Thus, in cases like this, no armed fighting occurs. However, a significant 
amount of conflicts fail the bargaining process, primarily due to the irrationality of 
leaders, the miscalculation of cost of war and the leaders' supposition of the inevitableness 
of war (Fearon 1995). The conflicts that the UN has engaged in are more likely to end 
with a truce or treaty (Besley and Reynal-Querol 2014; DeRouen and Sobek 2004). Yet, 
Besley and Reynal-Querol (2014) also argue that this fact might be an indirect link 
between states capacity and UN involvement, that states with higher capacity might be 
more prone to seek UN involvement. 
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CHAPTER 3. THE IMPORTANCE OF STATE CAPACITY  
IN POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES 
 
 
Migdal (1988) argues that one of the most critical issues facing developing countries is 
that their state capacity is not high enough to extract taxes to exert desired policies that 
would help to provide better public services. Preventing conflict relapse after its 
termination is as vital as bringing a conflict to end, especially considering the fact that 
civil war termination is plagued with conflict recurrence. UN Security Council Passed 
Resolution 1244 in the aftermath of NATO’s intervention in the violent conflict in 
Kosovo to establish an interim administration named United Nations Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK) (UNSC Res 1244, 1999). After several years of welcoming the UNMIK 
(Lemay-Hébert 2009a), the Kosovo Albanian, who consists of the majority ethnic group, 
grew a dissatisfied sense (UNDP and USAID, 2004). This was a result of a weak local 
legitimacy (Lemay-Hebert 2009). An important component of state building is both 
domestic and external legitimacy (Paris and Sisk 2009). In March 2004, this 
dissatisfaction led to riots, including interethnic violence which resulted in deaths, 
destruction of buildings, and thousands of displaced people (ICG 2004). In the end, 
UNMIK failed to generate a sufficient level of legitimacy to govern Kosovo (Doyle and 
Sambanis 2006). Indeed, one major predicament of civil wars is that they tend to resurface 
over a short period of time (see e.g., Walter 2004; Mason, Quinn and Gurses 2007; 
DeRouen and Bercovich 2008). This partly depends on the type of settlement in which 
the power distribution, annihilation of one side or third-party intervention substantially 
takes place. For example, Licklider (1995) argues that negotiated settlements tend to be 
less stable compared to military victory because in a military victory, one side loses its 
capability to rebel again. Additionally, Mason and Greig (2017) argue that peace 
agreements significantly increase the duration of peace. On the other hand, Doyle and 
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Sambanis (2000) point out that peace agreements likely decrease the risk of states 
plunging back into civil war if they are signed at the end of the war. Hegre and Nygard 
(2015) demonstrate that good governance reduces the conflict risk after conflict 
settlement. In their analysis, good governance is defined as a comprehensive term that 
includes bureaucratic quality, the rule of law, corruption, economic policies, military 
influence in politics, political exclusion and repression, and formal political institutions 
that are ingredients of state capacity. Fearon and Laitin (2003) find evidence that state 
capacity decreases the probability of civil war onset through policing rural areas and 
providing essential services to citizens. The low level of state capacity permits rebels to 
exploit resource extraction (Snyder 2006) since the state clumsily monitors and detects 
rebel movements. Thereupon, the rebels could find the financial opportunity to reorganize 
themselves. Obviously, state capacity is likely to play an important role in deterring 
conflict relapse after civil war settlement. In the post-conflict era, state capacity is also an 
important key factor in peacebuilding efforts in that a high capacity helps peacebuilding 
strategies to be successful. Walter (2004) argues that countries which provide a higher 
level of quality of life and a more participatory political system have a low likelihood of 
experiencing civil war relapse and multiple civil wars regardless of what happened in a 
previous civil war. On the other hand, some scholars link civil war recurrence to previous 
wars, arguing that because the political grievances were not resolved, civil wars tend to 
relapse (see e.g., Licklider1995; Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Hartzell, Hoddie and 
Rothchild 2001). In either case, what matters for preventing conflict relapse, lies in the 
aftermath of conflict termination. Such pertinent factors taken together provide a clear 
understanding of why post-conflict state capacity is crucial for policy implication. A 
strong state also matters for purposes of peace agreement implementation. In the case of 
a settlement, even if an agreement is reached among warring parties, the lack of capacity 
of the state may put the agreement in jeopardy by giving the rebels an opportunity to 
renege on the terms. In a case study of 14 conflict experienced states, DeRouen et al. 
(2010) find that high levels of state capacity enable a more successful peace agreement 
implementation. Moreover, in this context, Walter (2015) suggests that institutional 
accountability can reduce the risk of peace failure and Hegre and Nygard (2015) find that 
“good governance” is associated with a lower risk of peace failure. One substitute for low 
levels of state capacity might be a third-party intervention which can provide necessary 
financial, military, and professional guidance aid to warring parties for a successful 
agreement (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Arnault 2006). However, Arnault (2006) and 
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Doyle and Sambanis (2000) also suggest that third-party interventions may only have a 
superficial effect on the implementation at work. As Arnault (2006) demonstrates, the 
third-party intervention does not outweigh the negativity of low levels of state capacity 
in the cases of Burundi and Somalia. 
Post-conflict polities tend to have low investment rates and low rates of domestic capital 
formation. Once the conflict is settled, the capital flight direction can be reversed, leading 
to an increase in economic activities that consequently affect tax collection. In countries 
that experience civil wars, governments generally do not enforce protection of property 
rights regulations which cause some of the economic agents to abandon the economic 
activities. Tornell and Valesco (1992) argue that low protection of property rights 
reverberates as low investment ratios. North (1981) explains the governments’ 
motivations to ignore the protection of property rights as the cost of monitoring and 
collecting taxes decrease the ability of the rulers to raise revenue. That is why 
governments choose not to apply property rights properly in order to extract high tax 
revenues. Another reason for the diminishing rate of domestic investment is that lower 
protection of property rights increases the opportunity cost of investment thereby 
resulting in lower levels of productivity of capital and capital outflow (Svensson 1997), 
an argument which implies that the interaction of political instability and investment ratio 
can be measured through the quality of property rights. Post-conflict societies generally 
encounter two important risks: The risk of conflict relapse and the further worsening of 
the economy. Rwanda, in this context, presents a rapid economic recovery mainly due to 
aid inflows (Ansoms 2005). Burnside and Dollar (2000) argue that aid has no significant 
impact on growth, but aid can affect economic growth when channeled to good policy 
settings. Ansoms (2005) argues that Rwanda could benefit from high levels of aid to 
overcome its war-torn economy, due to its governance quality. The Rwandan government 
has proven to be an effective government that can implement economic reforms and 
policies and support private investment (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2012). 
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CHAPTER 4. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE CAPACITY  
AND CIVIL WARS 
 
 
Conflicts, especially armed conflicts, deteriorate societies’ economic development in 
several ways. Conflicts undermine economic development by pushing states into what 
Collier (1999) calls a conflict trap. Additionally, Besley and Persson (2008) show that 
countries that experienced internal conflict have a 7% lower GDP share of taxes compared 
to states without internal conflicts. Political institutions are among the most vulnerable 
state apparatus that are exposed to huge damage during conflicts, which leaves states 
unstable and lead to protracted civil wars. Another destructive threat to conflict-torn states 
is the loss of human capital along with overall GDP (Hoeffler and Reynal-Querol 2003; 
Ghobarah, Huth, and Russett 2003; Carlton-Ford and Boop 2010). Civil wars tend to 
endanger state capacity in the Middle East (Lu and Thies 2013). The region is plagued by 
ethnic and religious civil wars. One long-lasting civil war that spread geographically into 
the region is the Kurdish insurgency. Dispersed among Syria, Turkey, Iran, and Iraq, 
Kurds play a central role in state-building processes in the region. When these states have 
a weak central authority, Kurds enjoy significant concessions, but when these states 
establish strong central governments, they treat the Kurds with massacres, forced 
migration and tight political controls (Entessar 2010). In short, Kurdish insurgency, 
though in need of empirical analysis for future studies, might push these states bolstering 
effective and coercive state apparatus. Yet, other civil wars in the Middle East might have 
played a detrimental role in shaping the state-building process. For example, the Sudanese 
civil war (1983-2005) escorted a genocidal aspect and led Arabs into a division in Darfur 
(Schmidinger 2009), a war that eventually brought forth the secession of South Sudan. 
Hence, the Sudanese civil war might exemplify a negative impact of civil war on state-
capacity. Many Middle Eastern countries rely on oil revenues (Ross 2001). High levels 
of oil dependence discourage states to extract fewer financial resources from their 
 
 
19 
 
societies (Van de Walle 1998). The effect of oil on state-building in the Middle East is 
controversial among scholars. Some argue that oil is detrimental to state building because 
it provides an easy-catch rent (Karl 1997), impedes institution building (Shafer 1994), 
and undermines the economy (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Others point to the ability of oil 
to augment state capacity, in gaining external support to eliminate local rivalries, the 
loyalty of constituents is bought through redistribution (Morrison 2009; Smith 2004). 
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CHAPTER 5. A BARGAINING THEORY OF STATE CAPACITY AND 
POST-CONFLICT TAXATION 
 
 
Civil war, as previously mentioned, are plagued with recurrence and many scholars 
ascribe the reason behind the relapse of civil wars to the characteristics of the previous 
war such as the outcome of the previous war (Licklider 1995; Mason and Fett 1996), 
involvement of peacekeeping operations (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Fortna 2004), and 
the severity and the duration of previous conflict (Walter 2004; Hartzell and Hoddie 
2007). Some scholars, as a remedy, suggest that a high level of state capacity would cure 
the conflict recurrence. The relapse of civil war finds a central place in the concept of 
Tilly’s (1985) “multiple sovereignty”. According to Tilly, several armed groups emerge 
or remained from the last civil war and gain popular support to challenge the central 
authority which eventually is conducive to resurface of the civil war. Mason et al. (2011) 
argue that the extent that the multiple sovereignty is perpetuated in the post-civil war era 
is a function of the type of civil war settlement, whether the civil war is terminated in 
rebel victory, government victory, or negotiated settlement. Insomuch as a significant 
association has been evinced between state capacity and civil war termination, the time 
spell of the recovery becomes important for reorganization of rebel groups to reinitiate an 
insurgency. A long-lasted recovery of state capacity would naturally allow rebel groups 
enough time to recruit, reach financial sources, establishing intelligence networks, and 
possibly propagate to gain popular support to wage a war. One crucial question can be 
centralized as, how fast countries recover their state capacity once the conflict has settled. 
Put in a more generalized framework, what are the determinants of the speed of state 
capacity recovery? I postulate in this paper that the types of conflict settlement are 
significative explanations of capacity restoration. Concomitantly, I develop a theoretical 
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groundwork based on bargaining theory through which the interaction between civil war 
actors conditions the duration of state capacity recovery. 
The overall effect of a civil war on state capacity can essentially be categorized into two 
aspects. The first one is that civil wars are quite harmful to the economy, human capital, 
investments, and infrastructure, thereby eroding the tax base. Civil wars lead to a 
substantial loss of human life and are further detrimental to remaining human resources 
in terms of disability, health (Ghobarah et al. 2004), education (Kibris 2015; Shemyakina 
2006; Chamarbagwal and Moran 2011) and infant mortality (Davis and Kuritsky 2002). 
During civil wars, war expenditures dramatically increase, and a huge budget deficit 
troubles the economy. Because of the already stagnant economy, the tax revenues drop 
off substantially. Civil wars also decrease institutional quality and legitimacy of taxation, 
thereby encouraging tax evasion. Overall, tax revenue will most likely diminish as a direct 
consequence of the war-weary economy. Following this line of rationale, it is reasonable 
to expect a natural increase in tax revenue once a civil war ends, independently from how 
it is terminated such as government victory, rebel victory or a peace agreement. As a 
matter of fact, Gupta et al. (2002) conclude that there is a significant negative association 
between conflict-affected countries and government revenues in those countries. 
Secondly, the interaction between state and society can affect state capacity during a civil 
war through a rise of social contracts based on taxation bargaining and institutional 
building that stems from revenue extraction efforts. The revenue collection may follow 
state building through an increase in accountability of state. Moore (1998) argues that the 
greater dependence of a state on tax revenue, the more likely it is for a state society 
relationship to be shaped by accountability, democracy, and responsibility. Therefore, 
civil wars might reshape the relationship between state rulers and society through a 
bargaining process regarding the taxation. Ultimately, the interaction of these two 
aforementioned factors will determine the impact of the civil war on state capacity. 
 
5.1 During the conflict 
 
One tool in the hand of a government to deal with rebellion is that it might provide tax 
alleviation to mitigate the conflict as a part of conflict resolution. In this bargaining 
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process, particularly if the conflict is about greed or economic inequality, governments 
may think that the dissatisfied faction of the society will abate its rage in exchange for a 
tax cut. In this scenario, we can expect a decrease in taxation capacity. On the other hand, 
a government, in line with predatory theory, might rely on its constituency for a tax raise 
which, in turn, secures resources of the state that will fund the effort to quell the rebellion. 
The taxpayers will consent to pay a higher rate of tax (Downing 1992; Ertman 1997; Tilly 
1990) because otherwise in a case of losing the war they might lose their whole property. 
This increase in tax ratio during war times generally doesn’t reverse back in the post-war 
situation, which can possibly be explained by the “ratchet or displacement effect” 
(Peacock and Wiseman 1961). According to Peacock and Wiseman, during a national 
crisis, notably wars or major social turmoil, public resistance against taxation decreases. 
This reduced resistance is also maintained in the post-crisis period. Civil wars might vary 
across incidences in terms of their negative effects on economic activities. For instance, 
the more battle-related deaths that occur, the higher the loss of human capital, which 
basically means that the production capacity and, consequently, the tax revenue will 
diminish. Addison et al. (2002) find that conflict has a negative impact on tax-to-GDP 
and this effect escalates as the conflict becomes more violent. 
Several studies refer to ethnic civil wars as being more intractable (Licklider 1995; 
Kaufmann 1996) and involved in security dilemma (Posen 1993), which further increase 
the cost of war and impair the economy. The formidable nature of ethnic civil wars is 
likely to cripple the cooperation and cohabitation of adversary groups even after the war 
ends. Under such circumstances, I expect a negative relationship between ethnic wars and 
taxation capacity. 
 
5.2 Government victory 
Taxation capacity is a function of the government’s ability to create and sustain efficient 
institutions to collect taxes. In the case of a government victory, first of all, the 
government will be able to penetrate the regions that previously were under the control 
of rebel groups. As the government’s presence increases in the previously rebel-held 
regions, the tax raise institutions along with tax extraction will increase (Wimmer 2014). 
The presence of government also enhances the auditing capacity of the state which 
ultimately provides an additional push for a tax raise (Kiser and Kane 2001). 
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Hypothesis1: Conflicts ended with government victory are likely to restore the taxation 
capacity faster than otherwise. 
 
5.3 Rebel victory 
A decisive rebel victory, especially if the rebellion’s motive is revolutionary, means a 
substantial change in existing state institutions. The rebellion leaders might insist on a 
fundamental change of the relationship between the state and society (Sobek and Payne 
2010). Once the rebels win the civil war, it might take time to establish and functionally 
utilize the necessary taxation institutions. Whoever wins a civil war encounters the 
burdensome onus of restoring the war-torn economy. This task includes the bureaucratic 
capacity to collect taxes, afford basic public policies, and creation of incentives to put the 
economy in motion again, in addition to handling the wartime fiscal deficit and getting 
the economy back on the track. The rebels are particularly likely to have difficulty in 
fulfilling these crucial steps because, in contrast to the government, they are not 
experienced in enacting government policies.  
Hypothesis2a: Rebel victory increases the time spell for a capacity recovery. 
Conversely, some rebel groups enjoy military, economic, and administrative aid from 
external powers during the insurgency, mostly from neighboring countries. The influx of 
material aid and governance assistance to the rebels is likely to endure in the case of a 
rebel victory. The aiding country, thus, may want to reshape the new government in line 
with his economic, political, and ideological interests. It is highly possible that rebels will 
benefit from their supporters in terms of bureaucratic effectiveness, tax reforms, conflict 
resolution mechanisms to deal with new challengers to the government, and more of the 
same. Thus, a rebel group may be able to exert efficient tax policies and raise taxes with 
support from his allies. Aside from depending on the social structure and commitment of 
the insurgency group, the rebel group after a victory can integrate into the international 
system, thus taking advantage of foreign financial aid, foreign direct investment and 
technology and transfer of knowledge. Most importantly, the new government, due to its 
commitment to the international system and democracy might be welcomed by foreign 
countries. In fact, policy makers put serious energy in promoting democratic and 
economic institutions in the aftermath of civil war termination (Harris and Reilly 1998). 
A final advantage of a rebel group is that people might welcome the new government due 
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to frustration towards the old government due to corruption, authoritarian rule, and 
discrimination in favor of a small fraction of the society. This will causally enhance the 
legitimacy of the new rebel rule in the eyes of the people (Weinstein 2006) through which 
tax extraction efforts are facilitated. Put differently, rebel insurgency must create 
innovative and competent institutions in order to gain legitimacy and amass resources 
from the public. The Uganda experience exemplifies how a rebel victory may gain broad-
based support from the public and build capable institutions, additively taking credit from 
the World Bank (Toft 2010) following cessation of war. Prior to the end of the civil war, 
under Idi Amin rule, Uganda experienced harsh economic and political terms. 
Approximately 1 million displaced people, diplomatic crisis with Britain, low levels of 
democracy and rule of law, a 25% decrease in GDP, and a 60% decline in exports swept 
away Uganda’s politico-economic sphere (Rugumamu and Gbla 2003; Toft 2010). Yet, 
Yoweri Museveni along with the National Resistance Movement (NRM), the political 
organization of rebels, could build institutions, social and political organization networks 
from cities to urban areas, financial and political organizations, all which enhanced the 
legitimacy of the new ruling actors (Ofcansky 1996). Furthermore, the NRM expanded 
its inclusiveness by offering bureaucratic and governmental positions to its ex-rivals 
(Rugumamu and Gbla 2003). As a result, Uganda’s GDP per capita raised to 70% in 1994 
of what was at the independence, 80% in 1997, while it was only 58% at the end of civil 
war in 1987 (Reinikka and Collier 2001). 
Hypothesis2b: Rebel victories might accelerate taxation capacity recovery contingent 
upon the rebel group’s engagement in the international system. 
 
5.4 Negotiated settlement 
Negotiated settlements, unlike victories, require new rules of conflict management that 
adversaries jointly agree upon. These rules include a bargaining process that tries to 
address the interest of all signatories to the agreement. As such, a civil war that ends up 
with a negotiated settlement is likely to incorporate more citizens into the electoral system 
through a more representative government. Power-sharing arrangements work as a 
mechanism which ensures the interests of all people by giving them a share of state power. 
Power-sharing institutions form a set of more representative political centers that create 
opportunity for a big majority of constituents to partake in the decision-making process 
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through which conflicts become mollified (Lijphart 1977; Sisk 1996). Negotiated 
settlements that include power-sharing institutions are likely to end up building a more 
representative government. These institutions include veto power, a proportional electoral 
system, a proportional distribution in administrative appointments, and grand coalition 
(Lijphart 1977; Sisk 1996; Walter 2002). Snyder and Jervis (1999) consider these power-
sharing institutions that manage conflict as they provide a stable balance between warring 
parties. Consequently, a more diverse body of administration might prompt a deeper sense 
of belonging to the state, which also would generate a synergistic relationship between 
state and society, where the state produces security and therefore generates trust and 
accountability (Fukuyama 2004; Levi 1989, 2006). In return, accountability and 
transparency of government would increase and enhance taxation capacity as the 
extraction efforts emanate from a fiscal contract between the state and society (Brautigam 
2008; Moore 2008; Prichard 2015). In addition, since negotiated settlements scale down 
the number of war deaths compared to victories (Licklider 1995), a relatively small 
number of human capital will be lost, a factor that at least will abate the diminishing of 
economic activity, ceteris paribus. Thus, a reasonable prediction would be an increase in 
taxation capacity after a negotiated settlement. 
Hartzell and Hoddie (2003) categorize power-sharing into four types based on whether 
the agreement shares power along a political, economic, territorial, and military 
dimension. Political power-sharing constitutes the electoral proportional representation, 
administrative proportional representation, and executive proportional representation. 
The economic dimension of power-sharing is the distribution of economic resources 
among groups involved in the agreement. Territorial dimension is the division of 
autonomy between levels of government based on federalism or regional autonomy 
arrangement. Military dimension defines the distribution of the state’s coercive power 
among the warring parties. Power-sharing agreements facilitate a more peaceful 
environment and an enduring peace in the long-run between government and rebels 
(Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; Mukharjee 2006). One important fact that disrupts peace 
agreements is the credible commitment (Fearon 2004; Walter 1997,2002) because 
antagonists fear that the other side will crush them out once they become more powerful. 
However, a credible commitment problem can be addressed in a negotiated settlement 
which includes power-sharing institutions that solve the security concerns of ex-
combatants and distribute political and economic resources among them (Hartzell and 
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Hoddie 2007). Cardenas and Tuzemen (2010) find that state capacity is higher in more 
stable and equal countries. Furthermore, given a peaceful and politically more stable 
environment, growth rates will be positively related to political stability (Barro 1991) and 
significantly negatively related to political instability (Alesina et al. 1996). Positive 
economic growth rates will accompany an increase in tax take.  
Hypothesis3a: Negotiated settlements negatively affect the speed of taxation capacity 
recovery.  
Alternatively, a negotiated settlement that includes excessive power-sharing 
arrangements among central authority and regional power may leave the central authority 
weak to enact efficient tax policies. Additionally, a highly dispersed constitutional 
structure may give rise to local powers, which might inhibit bargaining over tax policy 
since every group might pursue their own interest. This failure might bring about 
deadlock in a state when it comes to reaching an efficient tax policy and extraction of 
taxes. Further to that, each group might follow their own public finances, pension funds 
or police force which can also worsen the tax policy. In Bosnia, for example, the Dayton 
Agreement distributed constitutional power among Bosniak Party for Democratic Action, 
Croat Democratic Union, and the Serbian Democratic Party. An important characteristic 
of their power was control of the public-sector appointments which, in turn, enabled them 
to construct a patronage system and finally manipulate public institutions (Cox 2001). 
Weak public institutions, corruption, and poor public service provisions decrease the 
legitimacy of the state in the minds of people, inducing constituents to avoid paying taxes. 
Hypothesis3b: Negotiated settlements result in shortening the time period of the 
restoration of tax capacity. 
Dependent variables 
Brewer (1989) explains several channels wherein tax collection might affect state 
capacity. Firstly, tax administration reforms may end with bringing more merit-based and 
professional strata, which ultimately enhance tax collection efficiency. Secondly, aiming 
to increase tax collection might force the government to expand state apparatus to a wider 
range of locations within the state that, in turn, can reach out to more tax resources. 
Thirdly, efforts to increase taxation might improve data and related information that are 
conducive to other government activities, say, economic planning, legislation, or business 
improvement. State’s extractive capacity is commonly operationalized as the tax-to -GDP 
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ratio. (e.g., Peacock and Wiseman 1961; Organski and Kugler 1980; Prest 1985; Seidman 
1986; Webber and Wildavsky 1986; Campbell 1993; Chaudhry 1997; Cheibub 1998; 
Fauvelle-Aymar 1999; Tsai 1999; Centeno 2002; Thies 2004). Moreover, Fearon and 
Laitin (2003) measure state capacity with per capita income and Collier and Hoeffler 
(1998) proxy state capacity with per capita income and the natural resource endowment. 
Taydas and Peksen (2007) proxy state capacity with the quality of government. Another 
index of fiscal capacity is the relative political capacity (RPC), an indicator that measures 
the extractive efficiency relative to other states (Arbetman and Kugler 1997; Johnson and 
Robinowitz 2005). The political capacity is the ability of a government to extract 
resources from its society for policy implementation purposes (Organski and Kugler 
1980; Arbetman and Kugler 1997). Kugler and Arbetman (1997) and Feng, Kugler, and 
Zack (2000) measure relative political capacity as the ratio of actual tax revenue to the 
expected tax revenue. Hendrix (2010) defines three measures of state capacity applied in 
the literature: military capacity, bureaucratic administrative capacity, and the quality and 
coherence of state institutions. In the quest for state extractive capacity, bureaucratic 
administrative capacity and the quality and coherence of state institutions as a measure of 
state capacity are more prevalent. Hendrix (2010) further suggests that the most 
theoretically and empirically justified measures of state capacity are bureaucratic 
administration and tax capacity. Schumpeter (1918) argues that the tax system goes hand 
in hand with the structure and history of a state. The capability of a state to collect taxes 
is a function of the consolidation, institutionalization, and projection of power of a state. 
As a matter of fact, North (1981) conditions the state as having the sole power of levying 
taxes on its citizens. Herbst (2000) describes the ability of the state to tax as the best 
measure of its scope. The incapability of states to impose an extensive tax base is an 
example of the weak state (Migdal, 1988). In this study, I will proxy state capacity with 
tax ratio (total tax/GDP) since this paper examines the linkage between conflict settlement 
and state capacity, a concept that requires the understanding of state authority, legitimacy 
and capability, the operationalization of state capacity with tax ratio will be more 
consistent with construct validity. Previously, several studies employed tax ratio to gauge 
state capacity in the examination of the association between civil war and state capacity 
(Sobek and Thies 2015; Thies 2010,2007,2009; Besley and Persson 2009). Nevertheless, 
using total taxes/GDP as a proxy for state capacity has a number of drawbacks. One pitfall 
of using total tax as a percentage of GDP is that it does not demarcate the countries 
according to through which causal mechanism they retained the total tax ratio. For 
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example, some countries may have a high ratio of total tax as a percentage of GDP 
because they have a high state capacity, however, other countries may have high ratios of 
total tax as a percentage of GDP because they heavily rely on international trade taxes, 
mining taxes or natural resources taxes. Since foreign trade taxes do not require a high 
level of administrative capacity, a country with a high tax ratio including a big ratio of 
foreign trade tax may not indicate a high degree of state capacity. In particular, countries 
with lower income rates rely heavily on trade taxes while higher income countries rely 
on income taxes (Besley and Persson 2013). Another shortcoming of proxying tax-to-
GDP for state capacity is that it does not make a distinction between the type of taxes 
(Hendrix 2010). This critique is justified by Kisangani and Pickering (2014) that 
examining direct taxes, indirect taxes and non-tax revenues have a more explanatory 
power for understanding state-building efforts. Government share of consumption is the 
amount of resources of a society consumed by the state. Government share indicates the 
scope and size of a government. Government share is also commonly employed in the 
literature to gauge state capacity (see e.g., Thies 2010; Ross 2006). Total revenue as a 
percentage of GDP represents a wider definition of government income, including taxes 
on income, social security contributions, payroll, capital gain, domestic goods, and non-
tax revenues. Obviously, total revenue shows the size and scope of the state in many 
aspects. Relative political capacity (RPC) is a measure of strength of a state based on the 
actual level of tax revenue compared to predicted levels of revenue. States have a higher 
score of 1 on RPC are extracting more than expected, and vice versa.  Studying the 
relation between the two large pieces of literature on the potential link between civil war 
settlement and state capacity introduces several challenges to this paper. Firstly, since this 
link has driven little attention, it poses some constraints on theoretical and empirical 
justification to draw a basic line for a model. Secondly, as civil war onset affects state 
capacity (Thies 2010) it is also likely that state capacity has an impact on civil war 
termination. A strong state in terms of its extractive capacity and bureaucratic efficiency 
may play a crucial role in bringing a civil conflict to a conclusion. State capacity is mostly 
measured as the ability of states to collect taxes. However, the reverse causal mechanism 
is also possible. A government is likely to increase its tax revenue by channeling more 
funds into administration capabilities and information technology investments. The tax 
raise can increase the state capacity (Prichard 2010). In studying conflict settlement and 
tax take, we encounter the endogeneity of state capacity that is built within the model. A 
strong state can win a quick victory or force rebels into a negotiated settlement. The 
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bilateral relationship comes with an endogeneity problem which is largely ignored in the 
civil war literature (Hegre and Sambanis, 2006). Examining the association between civil 
war and state capacity, Thies (2010) finds that the civil war incidence reduces state 
capacity. However, several studies show that during conflict, internal wars can also 
increase state extractive capacity through elite solidarity and construction of social 
identity (Centeno 2002; Schneider 2012; Thies 2005; Rodríguez-Franco 2016). Taydas, 
Peksen, and Drury (2007) point out that states with high extraction capacity tend to have 
a lower risk of civil war outbreak. These findings constitute us another reason to take the 
endogeneity issue seriously. For instance, a strong state can use its destructive military 
power to secure a decisive victory or use its accommodative capacities to bring the rebels 
into a negotiated settlement. The outcome of a civil war, in return, can also affect the 
power of the state, which is the focus of this paper. DeRouen and Sobek (2004) argue that 
bureaucratic effectiveness reduces the probability of rebel victory but doesn't have a 
significant impact on government victory, and the size of the army, measured as military 
personnel per capita, increases the probability of government victory, rebel victory, truce, 
and treaty compared to the continuation of war.  
 
Explanatory variables 
The primary explanatory variables of concern are a series of binary variables of each 
conflict settlement type: government victory, rebel victory, negotiated settlement. The 
dataset for the conflict settlement type is derived from UCDP (Kruetz 2016). The 
identification of conflict termination types is also from Kruetz (2010). I also employ a set 
of control variables that are commonly used in civil war studies. 
Ethnic fractionalization: Since the more ethnically divided a country is, the more 
significant the free rider problem becomes. The data for ethnic fractionalization comes 
from Alesina et al. (2003). 
Trade openness: Relative easiness of collecting foreign trade taxes, because they have to 
pass through several ports in a country and no complicated administrative capacity is 
needed (Adsera and Boix 2002), may make it difficult to capture true taxation capacity of 
a country. Trade openness is operationalized as the natural logarithm of a state’s total 
export and import divided by its GDP. 
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Conflict type: Scholars refer to the difficulties involved in peacebuilding efforts 
subsequent to civil wars (Collier et al. 2003; Kreutz 2010; Doyle and Sambanis 2006; 
Chapman and Roeder 2007). Therefore, to account for the impact of ethnic and territorial 
conflicts on post-conflict taxation capacity I created two dichotomous variables, whether 
the conflict is ethnic/ideological, or it targets the government/territory.  
Oil: Oil rents have recently been found in empirical studies to strengthen state capacity 
(Smith 2004; Morrison 2009; Thies 2010). 
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Table 1: Variables, definitions, and their sources 
Dependent Variables Definition Data source 
Tax ratio Total revenue minus non-tax 
revenue and social security 
contributions/GDP 
Thies (2010) 
Government share Government expenditure/GDP Penn World Tables  
Total revenue Taxes on income, profits, and 
capital gains, social security 
contributions, payroll, property, 
domestic goods, international 
trade and transactions, and non-
tax revenue/GDP 
Thies (2010) 
Relative political capacity Actual/predicted level of tax 
revenue extraction 
Arbetman-Rabinowitz et.al. 
(2011) 
Duration 1 year For each dependent variable; the 
difference between the first year 
after conflict that is equal to 1 
year before conflict  
 
Duration 3 year For each dependent variable; the 
difference between the first year 
after conflict that is equal to 3-
year average before conflict   
 
Duration 5 year For each dependent variable; the 
difference between the first year 
after conflict that is equal to 5-
year average before conflict   
 
Censored1  For each dependent variable; 
post-conflict values catch 1-year 
pre-conflict value =1, 0 
otherwise 
 
Censored3 For each dependent variable; 
post-conflict values catch 3-year 
average pre-conflict value =1, 0 
otherwise 
 
Censored5 For each dependent variable; 
post-conflict values catch 5-year 
average pre-conflict value =1, 0 
otherwise 
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Independent  
Variable 
Operationalization Data Source 
Government Victory Conflict ends with government 
victoy=1, 0 otherwise 
Kreutz (2010) 
Rebel Victory Conflict ends with rebel 
victory=1, 0 otherwise 
 
Kreutz (2010) 
Negotiated Settlement Conflict ends with negotiated 
settlement =1, 0 otherwise 
Kreutz (2010) 
Centralization  Ranges from 1 
(centralized/unitary) to 3 
(decentralized/fed 
 
Polity III dataset 
Initial real GDP Real GDP per capita in 1960 or 
the date of independence 
Penn World Tables 
Ethnic Fractionalization Probability that 2 randomly 
chosen individuals belong to 
different ethnolinguistic groups 
 
Fearon and Laitin (2003) 
Ethnic war Ethnic conflict=1, 0 otherwise Kreutz (2010) 
Oil  1 = > 1/3 of export revenues 
from oil, 0 otherwise 
 
Fearon and Laitin (2003) 
Africa Dummy Sub-Saharan African 
country=1,0 otherwise 
 
Latin America Dummy Latin American country=1, 0 
otherwise 
 
Interstate War Country involved in an 
international conflict = 1, 0 
otherwise 
Gleditsch et al. (2002) 
Secessionist Conflict Secessionist conflict=1, 0 
otherwise 
Kreutz (2010) 
Trade Openness Imports plus exports/GDP Fearon and Laitin (2003) 
Official development assistance as a percentage of total revenue Thies (2010) 
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CHAPTER 6. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
 
The data contains a total number of 203 civil wars from 1960-1999. However, due to 
missing data, the number of civil wars drops to 138. The dependent variables are the 
duration of recovery of tax-to-GDP, government share, and relative political capacity. In 
order to construct these variables, I measured 3- and 5-years average of these variables 
before the onset of civil war and compared it to the time interval after the onset of the 
civil war. The duration is recorded as the number of years it took after the conflict broke 
out for the relevant data to reach the level of pre-conflict data. For instance, if the 3-year 
average pre-conflict tax-to-GDP reaches its level 7 years after the conflict this variable is 
recorded as 7. Since I am analyzing duration analysis, in some cases, data never reaches 
its pre-war levels. In this case, I created a dummy variable and recorded those that did not 
reach their pre-war levels as 1, if they reached their pre-conflict levels within the 
availability of data I coded them as 0. This line of coding is created for all four dependent 
variables along with 3-year and 5-year averages. 
To test the hypotheses above, I utilize the Semi-parametric Cox model. There are several 
advantages in using this model to analyze the data I created. Firstly, the duration time of 
recovery does not take negative values and the Cox model is the most appropriate one to 
treat such data. Secondly, some countries never reach the assumed levels of taxation either 
because of conflicts or because of the data availability. These incomplete cases continue 
to reveal information about likelihood function rather than being excluded from the model 
under duration models. In addition, the Cox model does not presuppose any distributional 
form of unobserved duration data. 
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Table 2: Summary statistics 
    
 Variable |        Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------- 
      rebwin |      5,269    .0140444    .1176851          0          1 
      govwin |      5,269    .0222054    .1473648          0          1 
       peace |      5,269    .0453597    .2081114          0          1 
  durgvtshr1 |        171     2.51462    3.131165          0         22 
  durgvtshr3 |        172    2.674419     3.35586          1         18 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------- 
  durgvtshr5 |        167    2.676647    3.183673          1         17 
     durrpc5 |        183    4.972678    6.457325          0         34 
 durtotalrv5 |        188    4.010638    5.020801          0         27 
   durtaxrt5 |        188    3.946809    5.040726          1         27 
gvtshrcnsrd1 |        169    .1715976    .3781508          0          1 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------- 
gvtsharcns~3 |        172    .1569767     .364841          0          1 
gvtshrcencr5 |        167    .1796407    .3850425          0          1 
  rpccensrd5 |        183    .3442623    .4764306          0          1 
totalrvcecr5 |        188         .25    .4341689          0          1 
taxrtcencrd5 |        188         .25    .4341689          0          1 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------- 
   lninitial |      4,087    7.873954    .9683709   5.991667   11.08081 
secessionist |        723    .4301521      .49544          0          1 
      ethnic |      5,271    .0853728    .2794622          0          1 
centraliza~n |      4,379    1.350537    .7019073          1          3 
tradeopenn~s |      4,878    .6326737    .4313237   .0084711   4.253398 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------- 
interstate~r |      4,379    .0239781    .1529983          0          1 
     ethfrac |      5,269    .4056797    .2886111       .001   .9250348 
      Africa |      5,269    .2877206    .4527432          0          1 
       Latin |      5,269    .1710002    .3765449          0          1 
         oda |      4,976     .050339    .1298392  -.0119537   2.783185 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------- 
         oil |      5,262    .1347396    .3414777          0          1 
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CHAPTER 7. RESULTS 
 
 
I investigate the impact of the type of conflict settlements on the recovery speed of state 
capacity. 
Table 3 shows the results of three models of the covariates of only 1-year average ratios 
of government share values of pre-conflict. In all regressions along the models, I added 
control variables respectively, for the robustness check purpose. Accordingly, Table 3 
provides substantial support for the claim that rebel victory accelerates state capacity. 
This significant impact remains robust even after adding other various control variables. 
The hazard ratio coefficients of the negotiated settlement and government victory are 
greater than 1 throughout the models, showing an accelerative impact on state capacity 
recovery, however, is not significant.  In Table 4, 3-year average ratios of government 
share values of pre-conflict are employed into survival regression. Of the main 
explanatory variables, both rebel victory and peace hazard ratio coefficients are greater 
than 1, and significant at conventional levels of significance. This table gives further 
support to the claim in Table 3 that rebel victories shorten the time-span of a tax recovery. 
Additionally, these coefficients are robust once control variables are inserted. 
Interpretively, rebel victory and negotiated settlement significantly lessen the restoration 
time spell of state capacity. Providing support for Hypothesis2b, rebel victories might 
enjoy international economic and political assistance, a more legitimate government than 
the fallen predecessor, thus, experiencing rapid recovery of state capacity. Table 4 also 
corroborates Hypothesis3b that negotiated settlements, like rebel victories, shorten the 
time spell of the restoration of state capacity. This result can be interpreted as previously 
mentioned, negotiated settlements create an environment that function as a mechanism 
forming a more representative type of government by incorporating more people into the 
political system, especially people from the insurgency group. Additionally, peace 
agreements generally include power-sharing arrangement institutions that form a set of 
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more representative political centers that create an opportunity for a big majority of 
constituents to partake in the decision-making process through which conflicts become 
mollified (Lijphart 1977; Sisk 1996). These institutions include veto power, a 
proportional electoral system, a proportional distribution in administrative appointments, 
and grand coalition (Lijphart 1977; Sisk 1996; Walter 2002). This type of a representative, 
legitimate, and effective government enables tax institutions to reach more taxpayers, 
become more legitimate in the eyes of people, and pave the way for a proper tax 
collection. Peace agreement is also significant and greater than 1 with the dependent 
variable of total revenue with 5-year average. This confirms further robustness in our 
analysis regarding different dependent variables of state capacity. In all models, 
government victory coefficient is greater than 1, yet not significant, but with a better 
model, we have reason to believe government victory is good for state capacity. 
Another significant and time reducing variable is the natural logarithm of the initial GDP 
of countries at the beginning of independence. This also remains robust against the 
addition of other control variables. Countries, as the levels of initial GDP increase, 
become more advantageous in dealing with decreased state capacity following a civil 
conflict, regardless of the type of outcome. We also have reason to trace some 
determinants of state capacity back to the very establishment of the state institutions. 
These institutions, apparently, preserve their influence on state capacity for a long time. 
From the analysis of Table 4, we see that a more decentralized formation of government 
is significantly associated with a lesser time period of capacity recovery. Decentralized 
governments might allow local bodies of government to engage in tax collection efforts, 
which reduce the transaction costs of collection, minimize the bureaucratic burden and, 
in turn, facilitate tax take. Official development assistance seems to prolong the recovery 
capacity of the state which confirms what is found in the literature, that international aid 
funds have an inhibitive effect on state capacity by preventing resource mobilization 
efforts (Snider 1990; Bates 2001). Thereby, international funds become an easy-catch 
revenue for governments and they do not provide an extra push to extract from their 
constituencies. More importantly, in the presence of high levels of development aid, the 
state elites don’t necessarily need to engage in a bargaining course with their citizens to 
raise taxes for public policies. All these factors lead the state elites to not make reforms 
for a better taxation policy, thus resulting in a more prolonged tax recovery duration.  A 
much-debated variable, oil, which is considered to have a central impact on state capacity 
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in the literature, finds significant impact on capacity recovery with the dependent variable 
of tax ratio 5-year average in our analysis. Oil, similar to many nontax revenues, has a 
negative impact on capacity recovery by increasing its duration. Oil, in our analysis, 
renders a causal link similar to official development assistance between state capacity and 
civil war equation. A government that depends on oil will probably rely engage in a 
bargaining process with its taxpayers because oil presents an easy catch revenue. 
Table 4 shows that countries having engaged in interstate conflicts, in addition to civil 
wars, have a higher likelihood of recovering their taxation capacity in a short period of 
time. This lends support to the predatory theory that in order to fund war efforts, countries 
bargain with their citizens over taxation. As a result of this bargaining process, the state 
rulers come up with higher extractive capacities (Tilly 1975, 1992). The variable of 
interstate war in Table 6 also finds significance and support the findings in Table 4. This 
finding also corroborates the argument that state-building efforts through interstate wars 
are, in line with Tilly’s claim, still relevant in contemporary developing countries and in 
civil wars. 
Trade openness is significant and lesser than 1 with relative political capacity 5-year and 
total revenue 5-year averages dependent variables. This is likely a result of the relative 
easiness of trade taxes and in, turn, state rulers do not push forward for reforms for a 
better tax take. Africa dummy seems to be significant and has an accelerative effect on 
state capacity recovery in several survival analysis output. Although Africa is not 
homogeneous among its countries with respect to economic development, civil wars, and 
political affairs it poses a brighter picture regarding the effect of civil wars on state 
capacity recovery rate, contrasting to many analyses notably Herbst (2000). On the other 
hand, Herbst might be right when he implies that war may stimulate African countries’ 
efforts to make strong states.  
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Table 3: Government share with 1-year average 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                 (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)          (5)    
           Govtshar1    govtshar1    govtshar1    govtshar1    govtshar1    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
rebwin         1.986**      2.161*       2.123*       2.078**     2.064**  
              (2.58)       (2.56)       (2.46)       (2.70)       (2.66)    
 
govwin         1.151        1.270        1.358        1.320        1.276    
              (0.30)       (0.50)       (0.63)       (0.57)       (0.49)    
 
peace          1.258        1.284        1.255        1.288        1.261    
              (0.61)       (0.67)       (0.57)       (0.65)       (0.59)    
 
lninitial      1.084        1.200        1.256        1.192        1.204    
              (0.68)       (1.37)       (1.58)       (1.27)       (1.33)    
 
secessio~t     0.814        0.699        0.695        0.705        0.733    
             (-0.83)      (-1.50)      (-1.34)      (-1.33)      (-1.19)    
 
ethnic         0.996        1.039        0.995        1.085        1.079    
             (-0.02)       (0.15)      (-0.02)       (0.32)       (0.30)    
 
centrali~n     1.165        1.149        1.204        1.171        1.161    
              (1.17)       (1.08)       (1.34)       (1.12)       (1.04)    
 
tradeope~s     0.610        0.583        0.544        0.582        0.597    
             (-1.30)      (-1.45)      (-1.56)      (-1.35)      (-1.27)    
 
intersta~r     0.999        1.007        1.030        0.939        0.975    
             (-0.00)       (0.02)       (0.11)      (-0.23)      (-0.09)    
 
ethfrac                     1.835        1.618        1.233        1.206    
                           (1.50)       (1.23)       (0.56)       (0.49)    
 
Africa                                   1.125        1.383        1.359    
                                        (0.47)       (1.31)       (1.22)    
 
Latin                                    0.817        0.814        0.811    
                                       (-0.67)      (-0.67)      (-0.68)    
 
oda                                                   0.103       0.0949    
                                                    (-1.75)      (-1.79)    
 
oil                                                                0.863    
                                                                 (-0.55)    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N                136          136          136          136          136    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Exponentiated coefficients; t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
  
 
 
39 
 
Table 4: Government share with 3-year average 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                 (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)          (5)    
           govtshar3    govtshar3    govtshar3    govtshar3    govtshar3    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
rebwin         2.318**      2.325**      2.337**      2.291***   2.329*** 
              (3.26)       (3.18)       (3.19)       (3.69)       (3.65)    
 
govwin         1.088        1.097        1.213        1.167        1.148    
              (0.18)       (0.19)       (0.40)       (0.33)       (0.29)    
 
peace          2.198**      2.202**      2.135**      2.265**     2.204**  
              (3.10)       (3.09)       (2.79)       (3.18)       (3.11)    
 
lninitial      1.271        1.282        1.413*       1.302        1.349*   
              (1.94)       (1.68)       (2.26)       (1.93)       (2.19)    
 
secessio~t     0.791        0.780        0.820        0.832        0.885    
             (-0.92)      (-0.97)      (-0.74)      (-0.73)      (-0.49)    
 
ethnic         0.847        0.851        0.761        0.838        0.819    
             (-0.61)      (-0.60)      (-1.02)      (-0.68)      (-0.77)    
 
centrali~n     1.383**      1.380**      1.473**      1.430**     1.402**  
              (2.90)       (2.86)       (3.14)       (2.84)       (2.64)    
 
tradeope~s     0.619        0.615        0.542        0.603        0.624    
             (-1.20)      (-1.23)      (-1.48)      (-1.18)      (-1.10)    
 
intersta~r     1.645*       1.643*       1.729*       1.551        1.659*   
              (1.99)       (1.98)       (2.11)       (1.75)       (2.06)    
 
ethfrac                     1.047        0.924        0.588        0.562    
                           (0.11)      (-0.18)      (-1.23)      (-1.30)    
 
Africa                                   1.293        1.879**      1.809*   
                                        (1.10)       (2.65)       (2.50)    
 
Latin                                    0.845        0.818        0.776    
                                       (-0.55)      (-0.64)      (-0.82)    
 
oda                                                  0.0217*      0.0182*   
                                                    (-2.22)      (-2.27)    
 
oil                                                                0.753    
                                                                 (-1.15)    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N                138          138          138          138          138    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Exponentiated coefficients; t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 5: Government share with 5-year average 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                 (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)          (5)    
           govtshar5    govtshar5    govtshar5    govtshar5    govtshar5    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
rebwin         1.735        1.844        1.871*       1.724        1.828*   
              (1.53)       (1.83)       (1.96)       (1.86)       (2.15)    
 
govwin         1.687        1.804        1.915        1.776        1.677    
              (1.32)       (1.43)       (1.53)       (1.40)       (1.20)    
 
peace          1.556        1.582        1.570        1.704        1.649    
              (1.47)       (1.52)       (1.43)       (1.72)       (1.64)    
 
lninitial      1.111        1.177        1.234        1.077        1.103    
              (0.79)       (1.07)       (1.32)       (0.51)       (0.65)    
 
secessio~t     0.817        0.728        0.746        0.818        0.879    
             (-0.82)      (-1.26)      (-1.07)      (-0.73)      (-0.49)    
 
ethnic         0.858        0.887        0.829        0.900        0.884    
             (-0.58)      (-0.47)      (-0.72)      (-0.42)      (-0.49)    
 
centrali~n     1.400**      1.383**      1.450**      1.399*       1.372*   
              (3.00)       (2.83)       (2.95)       (2.53)       (2.33)    
 
tradeope~s     0.884        0.848        0.806        0.930        0.985    
             (-0.30)      (-0.41)      (-0.53)      (-0.16)      (-0.03)    
 
intersta~r     1.121        1.103        1.142        1.027        1.117    
              (0.28)       (0.24)       (0.32)       (0.07)       (0.29)    
 
ethfrac                     1.439        1.268        0.670        0.643    
                           (0.87)       (0.54)      (-0.89)      (-0.98)    
 
Africa                                   1.151        1.791*       1.722*   
                                        (0.58)       (2.21)       (2.08)    
 
Latin                                    0.849        0.883        0.845    
                                       (-0.54)      (-0.40)      (-0.52)    
 
oda                                                  0.0140*     0.0112**  
                                                    (-2.54)      (-2.59)    
 
oil                                                                0.735    
                                                                 (-1.19)    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N                136          136          136          136          136    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Exponentiated coefficients; t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION 
 
 
In this thesis, I examine which civil war outcomes contribute to the recovery of state 
capacity which deteriorates during the war. Employing survival analysis, I provide 
empirical support for the hypotheses that rebel victory and negotiated settlements 
significantly contribute to state capacity recovery. I demonstrate that civil wars 
terminated with rebel victory and negotiated settlements significantly reduce the time 
spell for a state capacity recovery considering that state capacity, measured with 
government share and total revenue of government, decrease during civil wars. 
The empirics reveal that, on one hand, Tilly’s argument of the predatory theory is 
supported by data that interstate war is significantly associated with state capacity 
recovery. However, I argue that different causal mechanisms are also at work in the 
contemporary developing world other than “states make wars and wars make state”.  
Alongside with war, peace also has a role in facilitating state capacity.  The investigation 
of this paper suggests to include the type of terminations of civil wars into consideration 
while examining state-society relations during and after civil wars. An interesting result 
of this paper is that insurgency groups might become an important actor in state formation 
efforts. This finding, contrary to previous studies, enlarges the pool of civil war actors by 
including rebellion side into both warfare and negotiation process. In addition, our 
findings contribute to the extant literature of the impact of civil wars on state capacity by 
supporting the claim that civil wars generally facilitate state capacity. In short, this paper 
suggests that the link between war and state formation needs to be further elaborated by 
disintegration of types of war, adding other actors to the equation such as rebellion and 
tax payers. While predatory theory might still be relevant in the contemporary world, it 
needs to be modified for a better understanding of the link between state capacity and 
war. 
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Table 4 shows that countries having engaged in interstate conflicts in addition to civil 
wars have a higher likelihood of recovering their taxation capacity in a short period of 
time. This gives support to the predatory theory that in order to fund war efforts, countries 
bargain with their citizens over taxation. As a result of this bargaining process, the state 
rulers come up with higher extractive capacities (Tilly 1975, 1992). This finding also 
corroborates the argument that state-building efforts are relevant in contemporary 
developing countries and in civil wars. 
Finally, with respect to future studies, it would be interesting to deconstruct tax ratio, 
government share, and total revenue to their ingredients to capture a better relationship 
between these variables and conflict settlement types. As such, for instance, total tax as a 
percentage of GDP does not demarcate the countries according to through which causal 
mechanism they retained the total tax ratio. For example, some countries may have a high 
ratio of total tax as a percentage of GDP because they have a high state capacity however, 
other countries may have high ratios of total tax as a percentage of GDP because they 
heavily rely on international trade taxes, mining taxes or natural resources taxes. Another 
example is that proxying tax-to-GDP for state capacity is that it does not make a 
distinction among type of taxes (Hendrix 2010). This critique is justified by Kisangani 
and Pickering (2014) that examining direct taxes, indirect taxes and non-tax revenues 
have a more explanatory power for understanding state-building efforts. To be brief, 
employing aforementioned dependent variables by disintegrating their components might 
yield more adequate results. 
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Table 6: Relative political capacity 5-year average 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                 (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)          (5)    
                rpc5         rpc5         rpc5         rpc5         rpc5    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
rebwin         1.206        1.469        1.751        1.663        1.626    
              (0.46)       (0.95)       (1.42)       (1.32)       (1.23)    
 
govwin         0.889        1.023        1.062        1.038        1.039    
             (-0.32)       (0.06)       (0.15)       (0.09)       (0.10)    
 
peace          1.073        1.165        1.497        1.522        1.469    
              (0.19)       (0.42)       (1.17)       (1.21)       (1.07)    
 
lninitial      1.200        1.396        1.550*       1.472*       1.469*   
              (1.09)       (1.68)       (2.30)       (2.10)       (2.07)    
 
secessio~t     1.227        1.021        0.830        0.837        0.858    
              (0.72)       (0.07)      (-0.54)      (-0.54)      (-0.47)    
 
ethnic         0.741        0.765        0.666        0.695        0.693    
             (-1.01)      (-0.94)      (-1.21)      (-1.13)      (-1.15)    
 
centrali~n     0.911        0.890        0.973        0.962        0.945    
             (-0.61)      (-0.75)      (-0.15)      (-0.21)      (-0.30)    
 
tradeope~s     0.349*       0.312*       0.283**      0.294**      0.308*   
             (-2.34)      (-2.50)      (-2.87)      (-2.77)      (-2.56)    
 
intersta~r     2.183*       2.183**      2.017*       1.954*       2.016*   
              (2.47)       (2.71)       (2.23)       (2.18)       (2.37)    
 
ethfrac                     2.089        1.315        1.010        1.016    
                           (1.36)       (0.49)       (0.02)       (0.03)    
 
Africa                                   0.853        1.059        1.028    
                                       (-0.57)       (0.19)       (0.09)    
 
Latin                                    0.333*       0.333*       0.333*   
                                       (-2.25)      (-2.25)      (-2.25)    
 
oda                                                   0.133        0.124    
                                                    (-1.22)      (-1.25)    
 
oil                                                                0.859    
                                                                 (-0.55)    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N                130          130          130          130          130    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Exponentiated coefficients; t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 7: Total revenue 5-year average 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                 (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)          (5)    
           totalrev5    totalrev5    totalrev5    totalrev5    totalrev5    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
rebwin         0.927        0.960        0.998        1.031        1.035    
             (-0.18)      (-0.09)      (-0.00)       (0.07)       (0.09)    
 
govwin         1.104        1.324        1.463        1.389        1.371    
              (0.24)       (0.70)       (0.91)       (0.78)       (0.72)    
 
peace          1.581        1.767        1.984*       1.957*       1.930*   
              (1.28)       (1.67)       (2.13)       (2.06)       (1.99)    
 
lninitial      1.083        1.248        1.404*       1.302        1.300    
              (0.56)       (1.29)       (1.96)       (1.63)       (1.61)    
 
secessio~t     1.225        0.976        0.990        1.058        1.072    
              (0.80)      (-0.09)      (-0.03)       (0.20)       (0.25)    
 
ethnic         0.843        0.888        0.773        0.833        0.830    
             (-0.67)      (-0.49)      (-1.02)      (-0.75)      (-0.76)    
 
centrali~n     1.091        1.050        1.161        1.135        1.130    
              (0.59)       (0.32)       (0.96)       (0.79)       (0.76)    
 
tradeope~s     0.513        0.458*       0.405*       0.443*       0.452    
             (-1.80)      (-1.99)      (-2.24)      (-1.98)      (-1.87)    
 
intersta~r     1.112        1.093        1.126        1.033        1.062    
              (0.28)       (0.23)       (0.30)       (0.08)       (0.15)    
 
ethfrac                     2.241        1.635        1.176        1.176    
                           (1.80)       (1.04)       (0.35)       (0.35)    
 
Africa                                   1.240        1.773*       1.745*   
                                        (0.86)       (2.22)       (2.09)    
 
Latin                                    0.610        0.638        0.638    
                                       (-1.18)      (-1.06)      (-1.06)    
 
oda                                                  0.0405       0.0394    
                                                    (-1.92)      (-1.92)    
 
oil                                                                0.936    
                                                                 (-0.24)    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N                135          135          135          135          135    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Exponentiated coefficients; t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 8: Tax ratio 5-year average 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                 (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)          (5)    
           taxratio5    taxratio5    taxratio5    taxratio5    taxratio5    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
rebwin         1.119        1.252        1.417        1.415        1.551    
              (0.32)       (0.66)       (0.91)       (0.99)       (1.38)    
 
govwin         1.113        1.286        1.328        1.276        1.307    
              (0.24)       (0.57)       (0.59)       (0.51)       (0.62)    
 
peace          1.065        1.171        1.740        1.699        1.457    
              (0.17)       (0.43)       (1.56)       (1.47)       (0.98)    
 
lninitial      1.158        1.311        1.439*       1.343*       1.376*   
              (1.11)       (1.80)       (2.45)       (2.07)       (2.30)    
 
secessio~t     1.065        0.846        0.571        0.603        0.662    
              (0.24)      (-0.57)      (-1.60)      (-1.54)      (-1.36)    
 
ethnic         0.942        0.996        0.986        1.023        1.015    
             (-0.21)      (-0.01)      (-0.04)       (0.07)       (0.05)    
 
centrali~n     0.934        0.911        0.959        0.952        0.872    
             (-0.48)      (-0.64)      (-0.28)      (-0.33)      (-0.84)    
 
tradeope~s     0.659        0.600        0.569        0.600        0.740    
             (-1.00)      (-1.22)      (-1.47)      (-1.29)      (-0.76)    
 
intersta~r     1.021        1.019        0.863        0.822        0.991    
              (0.06)       (0.05)      (-0.40)      (-0.54)      (-0.03)    
 
ethfrac                     2.035        1.535        1.100        1.171    
                           (1.61)       (0.95)       (0.22)       (0.37)    
 
Africa                                   0.622        0.848        0.734    
                                       (-1.81)      (-0.59)      (-1.15)    
 
Latin                                    0.293**      0.299**    0.276*** 
                                       (-3.14)      (-3.02)      (-3.30)    
 
oda                                                  0.0650       0.0369    
                                                    (-1.72)      (-1.85)    
 
oil                                                               0.465**  
                                                                 (-3.09)    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N                136          136          136          136          136    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Exponentiated coefficients; t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Figure 1:  Survival time of rebel victory with government share 1-year average 
 
 
Figure 2: Survival time of rebel victory with government share 3-year average 
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Figure 3: Survival time for peace with government share 3-year average 
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